000			03849nam a22003855i 4500
001			238588
003			ES-VaUEC
005			20240103143944.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
006			a||||fo|||| 00| 0
008			230627s2023 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783031307720
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-031-30772-0 _2doi
040			_aES-VaUEC _bspa _cES-VaUEC
050	0	4	_aHD61 _b2024
100	1		_aChernov, Dmitry. _eautor _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245	0	0	_aAverting Disaster Before It Strikes: _bHow to Make Sure Your Subordinates Warn You While There is Still Time to Act _cby Dmitry Chernov, Ali Ayoub, Giovanni Sansavini, Didier Sornette
250			_a1st ed 2023
264		1	_aCham _c2023 _bSpringer International Publishing
300	0	0	_a1 recurso en línea
336			_atexto _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aelectrónico _bc _2rdamedia
338			_arecurso electrónico _bcr _2rdacarrier
505	0		_aIntroduction -- The reason of the concealment -- Top 10 recommendations -- Results of the pilot project -- Discussion.
506	0		_aOpen Access
520			_aSome of the major industrial disasters could have been prevented. When the facts of what happened are established, their stories share a common thread: before things spiralled out of control, there were workers at the affected sites who knew that the situation was dangerous, and could become catastrophic unless immediate action was taken. But tragically, nobody dared to tell the decision-makers who could have authorized that action. With no idea of the risks they were taking, the people in charge continued as normal... and disaster struck. Because vital information about risks could not flow freely from the shop floor to the director's office, the crucial decisions were not made in time. This observation has been documented in the following major technological accidents: Challenger space shuttle explosion (USA, 1986); Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster (USSR, 1986); Deepwater Horizon oil spill (USA, 2010); Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant disaster (Japan, 2011); and numerous other industrial disasters. After accidents like these, losses and costs for dealing with the consequences are often hundreds - or even thousands - of times greater than the finances that would have been required to deal with the risks when they were first recognized. This handbook is about how to transform the way large critical infrastructure companies communicate about safety and technological risks. It aims to support senior managers to get the information they need from their subordinates concerning the risks they are facing, in order to prevent accidents before it is too late. The recommendations in this handbook are based on interviews with 100 executives at various levels, working in 65 critical infrastructure companies around the world, in power, oil and gas, metals, chemicals and petrochemicals, mining and other industries. The recommendations of these leaders were also tested in the pilot project, in an industrial company which is the world leader in its sector. More than 400 managers at various levels of the corporate hierarchy, and employees at several of the company's industrial plants, took part in the project. This open access handbook is written for the owners, senior managers, and industrial safety directors of critical infrastructure companies. .
856	4	0	_uhttps://go.openathens.net/redirector/universidadeuropea.es?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30772-0 _zAcceso a este recurso digital (usuarios Universidad Europea de Valencia)
912			_aZDB-2-BUM
912			_aZDB-2-SXBM
912			_aZDB-2-SOB
942			_2lcc _cLE
988			_aSpringer_Business_2023
999			_c238588 _d238588